Linguagem e mente na filosofia da psicologia de Wittgenstein

Abstract

The present research is delimited to Wittgenstein's questioning of the problem of the expression of psychological concepts correlated to the mental and the role of a philosophy of psychology in the inquiry into first-person experience. Problems of language concerning the expression of the mental arise insofar as we engage with first-person experience. Expressions of sensations are notably understood as the externalization, through language, of a private mental event. Adopting this thematic framework, the research centers on the following works by Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, works in which Wittgenstein addresses first-person experience, expressions of sensations, and the epistemic presuppositions that suggest the mental as a private domain in first-person expressions. The problem may be articulated through the following question: how could first-person language provide a panorama for the objective investigation of the meaning of the mental? The aim of the present research concerns both the problem of the objectivity of first-person expressions and the methodological problem for the investigation of propositions and expressions that suggest the mental. To this end, the research seeks to: 1) provide descriptions of the aspects of the mental through the analysis of language in accordance with Wittgenstein's approach; 2) expound the methodological framework concerning first-person expressions; 3) investigate whether, within certain limits, an objectivity of first-person expressions is possible. It is argued that, by rejecting the character of epistemic authority, the application of Wittgenstein's methodological aspects may provide a panorama for the understanding of psychological concepts relative to the mental through language.