Conhecimento científico em meio a revoluções: características que permitem pesquisa e ruptura a partir da filosofia de Thomas Kuhn

Abstract

This research aims to analyze the factors that influence the practice of normal science and the abandonment of theories during periods of crisis, taking Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy as its theoretical reference. It seeks to examine the model of rationality that encompasses the processes of convergent thinking and the justification of decisions within contexts of paradigm substitution. To achieve the proposed objective, it is first necessary to understand the concept of a paradigm and its relationship with the scientific community. By establishing this relationship and recognizing that the sharing of a common paradigm is what enables the progress of research, other concepts directly linked to it become fundamental for the development of this investigation. Special attention will be given to the concept of exemplar, with emphasis on the tacit dimension of scientific practice and on the skills required for research development. These skills serve as the starting point for understanding how scientists may react during periods of crisis. Furthermore, Kuhn’s understanding of the cognitive criteria for theoretical analysis and the limits of comparison between different theories provides essential elements for grasping his conception of rationality within the context of scientific development. Thus, the notions of decision algorithm, the distinction between individual motivations and communal reasons, as well as the concept of incommensurability, form the basis for comprehending Kuhn’s thought regarding the aspects of scientific development that make both normal science and scientific revolutions possible.