Da originariedade do fenômeno de mundo em Ser e tempo

Abstract

This dissertation aims to interpret the so-called primordial character of the phenomenon of the world, moving within the contexts of Martin Heidegger's Being and time. We assume an interpretative path with a view towards the unity of two philosophical positions: the first says that world is an intrinsic phenomenon to the question of the meaning of being, the second, that it enables the radical conception of who we are. For Heidegger, asking about the meaning of being means turning to our own being, seeking to comprehend how being makes itself possible to us. When the question becomes articulated from this possibility, it is a primordial question, a question towards origin. The world, in its turn, is a constitutive phenomenon of our being. In this way, if we ask about world seeking this primordial, our question goes towards the relation between our way of being of and being. The phenomenon of being-in-the-world becomes central to our research. It is necessary to confront the question: how can we interpret a primordial character from the phenomenon of the world? Our general objective is to gain the proper comprehension of world as an originary phenomenon. This imposes on us at least two specific objectives, to which the chapters of the work correspond: a) to elucidate the horizon in which the question is posed by the meaning of being in Being and time (chapter 1) and b) to comprehend in which sense it is said that our being-there “is” in the world (chapter 2). With this double analysis we arrive to the evidence that the world is a phenomenon of significance. This opens us to the task of comprehending that being makes itself possible to us primarily and primordially in a significative way (chapter 3). We hope to reach a comprehension that the originary, in world, becomes evident from significance. To achieve this, in a mostly descriptive and thematic way, we proceed with interpretative purposes and bibliographical means. Being and time (1927) is primary source; as a secondary source, Heidegger's courses and lectures (between 1919 and 1930), as well as interpreters works about pertinent themes.