Do fenômeno da simpatia segundo Max Scheler e suas implicações nas relações de acolhimento familiar

Abstract

The research investigates the phenomenon of sympathy within the scope of the phenomenology of the German philosopher Max Ferdinand Scheler (1874-1928). Here, the theme of sympathy is approached in the correlation that is called “grammar of feelings”. In the present work, the phenomenological concept of sympathy will occupy the centrality of our discussion, which aims to make it understandable how, in the light of Scheler's philosophy, we can treat foster care relationships in families with children and adolescents at social risk. Thus, delimiting our theme and field of philosophical work, we assume the objective of approaching the phenomenon of sympathy so that its thematization elucidates the understanding of the processes of welcoming relationships already mentioned. As far as we can see, we believe we can support the hypothesis that sympathy (in its peculiar aspect of compassion) is the feeling at the basis of relationships between individuals who make themselves available to offer care to children/adolescents who are in a situation of protection. To be able to follow the path that would lead us to the intended validation of the hypothesis, we will begin with the approaches that Scheler made to the philosophical movement of phenomenology, a movement that became significant at the beginning of the 20th century. Also, highlight the way in which our philosopher understood phenomenology, giving it a personal stamp, imprinting a character of originality. It was by making use of the new way of philosophizing that Scheler built his theory of value, and later structured his ethics. To achieve this, Scheler begins by understanding the phenomena of sympathy, given that thinkers of his time placed the affection of sympathy alongside feelings of altruism, a position with which Scheler disagrees. Thus, in our research, there will be an attempt to identify the prevalence of the affection of sympathy in the establishment of relationships between foster families and those receiving care. Finally, we assume that throughout this research it will be possible to highlight the connection that the concept of sympathy has with the others that our philosopher proposes, for example: empathy and compassion.