Conflitos de agência entre gestores e associados em uma cooperativa de crédito a luz da teoria da agência

Abstract

The separation between ownership and the control of an institution occurs when management is transferred to a third party. Agency conflict stems from the disagreement of this relationship. Reducing agency conflict between principal and agent by separating ownership and control, transaction costs ensure an organization's cost savings and maximization of its results. Credit unions consider themselves to be a society of people and therefore asked to analyze how a credit unions perceive and react to agency conflict. Given the informational asymmetry, we can see the existence of agency conflict between cooperatives and cooperated due to the lack of frequent data disclosure, little education about cooperatives and, mainly, the lack of monitoring of members by the counselors, corroborated by the organizational particularity of the cooperative with dispersed ownership structure. The information provided in interviews confronting the cooperative's statute points to numerous agency conflict reduction tools. For business, this research collaborates in helping the internal factors of the cooperative. It is concluded the existence of agency conflict in the cooperative analyzed through information asymmetry, cooperative opportunism with the cooperative and lack of monitoring.