Governança corporativa e seus determinantes: um estudo com a qualidade da informação contábil, competitividade de mercado e risco não sistêmico

Abstract

The present study aimed to analyze the chances of economic and financial performance, the quality of accounting information, competitiveness, and risk to determine the Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance for the coming fiscal year. For this purpose, the theoretical foundation approaches from the agency theory, which demonstrates the interests and the relations of the principal and the agent, to the corporate governance and its mechanisms, as well as the quality of the information and its metrics and the competitiveness. Other relevant points in this research are the non-systematic risk and the economic and financial performance of companies. The present study was performed according to the quantitative approach. To analyze the objectives of this research, logistic regression was used. In which the dependent variable refers to BM&FBOVESPA's set of more demanding corporate governance practices, the Novo Mercado. However, the temporal slice refers to the subsequent year of the companies characteristics; so the results obtained in 2016 are determinant for governance practices of 2017. The sample is composed of the companies that are listed in the Bovespa Index. The results showed statistically significant coefficients to determine the chances and the probabilities of occurring the code of practices studied. The theoretical implication evidenced refers to the prediction of practices because if it is possible to predict when companies can adopt a code of practices of corporate governance from their financial reports, one cannot ignore that governance practices are strategic decisions. The theoretical implications have also shown that it may be a mistake to not associate corporate governance practices with the internal and external characteristics of the company, that is, to use it as an independent variable to influence the others without recognizing these limitations. It can be said that corporate governance practices are as volatile as the quality of information reported to stakeholders. Moreover, assets volatility is a reflection of the returns obtained through investor expectations, and thus, corporate governance practices can be one of the means of showing investor confidence, and consequently, stabilize this volatility. The risk also arises from the degree of market competitiveness. Through the Herfindahl index, it was observed an increase in the probability of occurrence of governance practices according to the degree of market concentration. Besides, it was evidenced that when companies increase their performance, the principals tend to demand the agents' governance practices with the intention of reducing the risks. They spend resources to make sure that the results obtained are reliable through governance practices. Since agents tend to adapt their management practices according to the results obtained, either underperformance or the risk associated with the high returns that require supervision of management practices. Therefore, the dissociation governance and results from the same period are important because governance practices are about the decision that can be made between the agent and the principal in advance.