Transformações da linguagem: crítica e afirmação no discurso de Nietzsche

Abstract

In a specific scope, this dissertation intends to demonstrate and defend the hypothesis that demolition and creation, i.e, critique and affirmation are antagonistic aspects and, at the same time, complementary in Nietzsche s discourse, therefore fundamental to the formation of a affirmative philosophical project so inclined to "become what one is." In a general context, our goal is to analyze the issue of language in Nietzsche's work from the perspective of the "three transformations of the spirit", defending the idea that, regarding the question of language, we can not find any evidence in the writings of Nietzsche of a "Nietzschean theory of language", since what we have are transformations of language. For Nietzsche, the establishment of a metaphysics of language was a crucial step for that the animal man could build a "real world" (wahre Welt), and with it an "apparent world" (Welt scheinbare), in contradiction (Widerspruch) with the "actual world" (Welt wirklichen). In this sense, the Nietzschean critique of language - first under an rhetoric perspective, then later in areas of its psycho-physiology - "sought to dismantle the metaphysical assumptions that since the rise of Western thought gave support to the narratives of "real worlds" and "apparent worlds". However, after the demolition of the metaphysics of language we face the following question: is it still possible to philosophize? In fact, the critical approach to early writings, due to be strictly in the context of denial, seems to us to escape this question, which was necessary to cross towards the elaboration of a affirmative philosophy. In this sense, language is taken by Nietzsche as a organism responsible for reporting the "itself", while it is envisioned as a therapy, since, as an expression of an inner state, it does not require the reader the altruistic attitude of losing "his/herself" and acceptance of others in writing - which would indicate, according to the philosopher, the degeneration of life. Rather, it intends to implement in the reader a healthy egoism, a vigorous freedom necessary for his/her continuing search for him/herself. Finally, we find that when assessed under the criterion of transformation, the Nietzschean question of language reveals the antagonism between the necessary and critical part of his affirmative philosophy, without which it would certainly be impossible to write "so good books."