Da filosofia do nada à filosofia da práxis: Sartre em movimento

Abstract

The intent of this dissertation is to analyze the transition from philosophy to philosophy of praxis in Jean-Paul Sartre. It is proposed to analyze the speculative ancestry between these two periods in order to show the possibility of being-for-itself to be guided by a profile more optimistic, one can find the ontological project articulated the theory of engagement. The starting point is the contingency, we launched-in-world, everything is contingent, this notion opposes the inflection of necessity in which the world can only be originated by consciousness. The phenomenal world is there before our eyes to be discovered, to be intended by consciousness. In Sartre, it does not put the primacy of being teleological knowing, in the sense that there is no essence fanning existence, consciousness occurs through a process of emptying the "decompression" of being; solved if the ground under the bias is essentialist " kicked out "of consciousness, then, at least, Sartre would be proposing a kind of fundamental crisis and this criticism culminated with what he calls ontological anguish or despair. There is no reason to live, life would refer to total failure, to nothing, its absurdity. With the reality of the world, the circumstances, the facticity and contingency, after all, always precede the existence of the essence. Philosophically arises existence in terms of subjectivity and great thinkers have proposed to articulate precisely the way in which we can know not only the world, but the man in his ontological context and, in the case of Sartre's thought, this occurs in his ontology for the rule of existential phenomenological actualism, which will always answer the fundamental design of the evidence to choose life in the form of free project while not the world be made of other consciousnesses, each subject does not act in your project solitarily, and questioning the intersubjectivity, of being-for-another, in his presence, leads to the action conflicted because the being-for-another aims the restriction of freedom that does not belong. Note also sharp distinction as the author think the conception of subjectivity in the ancestry of his works (Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason). Although talk of radical change, the route undertaken by Sartre is nothing more than the necessary maturity and convergent adaptation his existentialism, pouring for some optimism, which can only be understood in terms of engagement. This innovative concept goes beyond a design centered on sympathy or antipathy to targeting policy, but the final understanding of Sartre is the resumption of authenticity and its confluence ethics, intending to blame the individual in recognition of their project. Optimism is not lyrical, much less prosaic, is immanent and present, the being-for-itself is coated this "power" to transgress the cases put, resigned to any attempt to dogmatize or substantiate the reality of human hampering their freedom first to make yourself as being-possible.